基于水权交易和面源污染控制的农户灌溉施肥行为模型

将水权交易和面源污染控制有机结合,以种植面积、农业用水定额、污染物浓度为约束条件,运用边际分析方法建立农户灌溉施肥行为模型,分析水权交易和排污控制对农户行为的影响。结果表明:灌溉用水量与农作物价格成正相关,与交易水价和边际灌溉成本成负相关;一定范围内肥料施用量与农作物价格成正相关,与边际施肥成本或边际环境成本成负相关。模型证明,当农业用水定额内水权可交易时,水市场的存在和水价政策将激励农户减少灌水量,节约用水。     

一种机载三维音频技术的快速计算方法

针对机载三维音频应用的实时性需求，提出了一种基于单耳相对头相关传递函数和改进型混响模型的机载三维音频快速实现方法，在较传统实现方式性能无明显下降的情况下降低了80%的计算量。对提出的算法在F-16战斗机模拟强噪声环境下进行相关主观试听实验，同时在某型飞机音频系统中实验验证。实验结果表明,所提方法在实时处理3路三维音频时，三维音频方位分辨精度在5°以内，可满足实际机载平台使用需求。     

时间压力对网络冲动性购买的影响研究：交易效用和感知风险的调节

以往关于时间压力对冲动性购买影响的研究结论具有两面性，即促进或抑制。文章引入交易效用和感知风险两个调节变量，通过两个实验探讨了时间压力对网络冲动性购买倾向影响的边界条件。首先，当交易效用较高时，时间压力的增加会导致其网络冲动性购买倾向的提高；而当交易效用较低时，时间压力的增加会导致其网络冲动性购买倾向的降低（实验一）。其次，当人们感知风险较低时，时间压力的增加会导致其网络冲动性购买倾向的提高；而当人们感知风险较高时，时间压力的增加会导致其网络冲动性购买倾向的降低（实验二）。研究结论可以帮助电商企业进一步了解消费者的冲动性购买行为，充分利用时间压力的影响，制定更灵活有效的促销策略。     

Factors Influencing Organic and Fair Trade Coffee Growers Level of Engagement with Cooperatives: The Case of Coffee Farmers in Mexico

We study the factors influencing the percentage of organic and fair trade certified coffee sold through a cooperative by growers of five cooperatives in Mexico. The percentage of coffee sold through the cooperative was used as a proxy of growers’ engagement with a cooperative. Using factor analysis and a fractional probit regression, we evaluated the proposition that the level of engagement can be explained by transaction cost economics, social norms and connections, and farmer and farm business characteristics. We found that farm size, uncertainty regarding cooperative time of payment to the members and cooperative commitment on price to be paid negatively influence the level of engagement. In contrast, asset specificity, relational commitment, and price have a positive impact on engagement. Our results may help cooperatives and policy makers to build strategies aiming to increase this level of engagement. This is relevant because lower grower engagement has been found to be positively correlated with weak performing cooperatives.     

跨国企业的转让定价策略--基于价值链的案例研究

在全球价值链分工日益成熟的背景下,跨国企业的关联交易安排日益复杂,如何制定转让定价规则以保证整体税负和风险水平同时较低成为跨国企业面临的新问题。通过W集团在关联交易中转让定价策略的案例,运用价值链分析和功能风险分析,从企业价值创造和税收产生的源头着眼,沿着价值链的推进分析了VIE模式的跨国企业在转让定价中的税负与风险问题。基于价值链分析构建出跨国企业的转让定价分析模型,可为跨国企业制定转让定价策略提供新思路,也有助于丰富价值链分析的应用领域。     

Digital Platforms and the Nature of the Firm

Abstract:

Digital platforms turn traditional approaches of the firm, which relied on the wage relation to explain the major difference between firm and market, upside down and underline the advantages of coordination through organization over coordination through market. This study aims to propose a definition of the firm able to integrate, besides the integrated firm, also hybrid forms such as networks of subcontractor/subcontracting firms as well as atypical forms such as digital platforms. By reactivating the firm-boundary problem, this article suggests putting valorization by labor at the heart of the firm’s decisions concerning integration. It suggests therefore a general definition of the firm as a techno-institutional center of capital valorization, provided that firms make profits by means of the appropriation of labor incorporated into their (productive, structural, intellectual) capital through institutional arrangements. By stressing the relation of production between the owners of the means of production and the direct producers, the approach of the firm supported here should allow to cover the different existing models of the firm, from the classical firm to hybrid models, around which the boundary debate has revolved, to digital platforms.     

Related party transactions and firm value: The moderating role of corporate social responsibility reporting

This study investigates the influence of related party transactions (RPTs) on firm value. Further, it examines whether a firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting reflects its corporate values and ethical concerns, therefore mitigating the value-destroying effects of RPTs. Based on 274 observations from publicly listed firms in Indonesia, our results show that RPTs (i.e., related party sales) are negatively related to firm value. Further, we find that in the presence of better CSR reporting, the relationship between RPTs and firm value becomes more positive. This is in line with the view that CSR reporting, which reflects firms’ ethical concerns, may serve as a mechanism against managers’ opportunism. However, we find that related party payables have a positive relationship with firm value. Further investigation reveals that, although certain RPTs show a short-term, value-enhancing effect, these transactions seem to result in subsequent tunneling activities, suggesting managerial opportunism in the long term.     

行政审批改革与制度性交易成本——基于效率评价的视角

制度性交易成本是经济主体为遵守制度规定而产生的非生产性成本,行政审批改革通过提高经营效率、节约时间成本、降低资金成本和促进行业竞争四种途径降低制度性交易成本。本文通过对我国地市级面板数据的实证分析后发现,行政审批改革可以有效降低地区制度性交易成本;当行政审批改革发生在营商环境相对较差的中西部城市、距离省会城市较近的城市以及当城市获得法律支撑时,能够更显著地降低当地制度性交易成本。本文据此提出如下政策建议:深化行政审批改革,减少不必要的审批事项;健全改革激励机制,确保政策的贯彻与落实;通过机构设置、法律规定、权责划分等进行配套措施改革。     

Bertrand versus Cournot competition in a downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

Focusing on foreign ownership in the private firm, we examine the Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopolistic market with vertical market structure. We have found that if public and private firms were charged with uniform price for their inputs, then Cournot-Bertrand ranking in market outcomes confirms those obtained by Ghosh and Mitra (2010). This implies that under uniform pricing in the upstream sector, the vertical market structure does not have substantial influences on Cournot-Bertrand ranking. However, if discriminatory pricing is adopted, firm's profits, output, and social welfare are often reversed to those obtained from uniform pricing in the upstream sector. Given the closeness of products, if the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently low, social welfare in Cournot competition can exceed that of Bertrand competition, contrasting with the standard welfare ranking that Bertrand welfare is strictly higher than Cournot. This implies that Cournot competition can be more socially desirable than Bertrand in mixed oligopoly with vertical market structure if discriminatory pricing scheme is adopted by foreign upstream monopolists.